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Abstract 
In spite of the importance of workplace training in human capital accumulation, relatively 
little is known on its returns for workers and firms. Our investigation tries to fill this gap by 
developing an alternative modelling that examines the determinants of firm productivity and 
wages, on the one hand, and the internal rate of return to firm training investments, on the 
other. Our estimates, obtained using a firm-level dataset in which we have detailed 
information on firm-provided training, indicate that an additional hour of training per worker 
implies some 0.1 percent increase in productivity. We also found that 2/3 of the gains in 
productivity are captured by firms and 1/3 by workers. In turn, the internal rate of return for 
an average firm in our sample is equal to 11 percent while for workers it is considerably 
higher at 24 percent. As expected, the dispersion across firms is very high, with 66 percent of 
firms having a positive internal rate of return for an annual depreciation rate of 35 percent.  
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1. Introduction 
The GDP growth in the last two decades in Portugal is both modest and mostly based 
on an intensive use of primary inputs, labor and capital. In other words, it seems that little has 
been done to increase the potential product growth, a key condition for economic 
sustainability in the near future. 
A critical determinant of the growth of potential GDP is firm investment in human 
capital through formal training. However, and contrarily to the literature on the returns to 
schooling and labour market experience in general, comparatively little is known about the 
return rate to firm-provided training. In this investigation, we try to fill this gap by studying 
the determinants of firm productivity and wages, on the one hand, and by deriving an 
alternative measure of the internal rate of return for firms and workers, on the other.  
Human capital theory was conceptually developed in the 1960s, and received a major 
empirical boost from Mincer’s (1974) classical work. Studies on the impact of training are 
much more recent though. They have also been mostly focused on the wage gains of 
individual workers, which, in the Portuguese case, for example, have been estimated to be in 
the 10-20 percent range (Hartog, Pereira and Vieira, 2000, Budria and Pereira, 2004, and 
Saraiva, 2008). 
But the gains from training are not exhausted by the returns for workers. A sizeable 
fraction of productivity gains is captured by firms in order to offset the corresponding costs 
(Bartel, 2000), which means that the impact of training on productivity is expected to exceed 
the growth in wages (Dearden, Reed and Reenen, 2006, and Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz, 
2006).  
An even less documented aspect is the structure of training costs. Given the richness 
of our dataset, we are in a good position to disaggregate total costs into direct and indirect 
costs and hence estimate a better measure of the internal rate of return to training from the 
perspective of firms and workers. Thus, an additional contribution of the paper is to obtain a 
general formulation for the internal rate of return to training, namely one that not only uses 
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the available data on training costs and worker and firm participation in training, but also the 
wage bill and other balance-sheet information, with these two pieces of data taken from 
Balanço Social, a comprehensive Portuguese statistical source described below. 
We also develop a general model for the determination of the stock of training. Our 
approach allows us to circumvent some limitations found in the literature, namely those 
connected with the possibility of firms offering more training when the demand for output is 
low. Another novelty is related to the fact that in our implementation we control for firm and 
worker unobserved heterogeneity. This seems proper as unobserved heterogeneity of firms 
and workers is likely to be correlated with training participation. 
Our modeling considers an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function, with the 
training variable treated as an additional input. Then, we derive the model for firm-level 
productivity and wages to finally obtain an analytical expression for the internal rate of return 
to training. This paper is therefore organized as follows. In the next section we present the 
modeling strategy to evaluate the relation between productivity (and wages) and firm-
provided training. Then, we investigate the relationship between training costs and training 
intensity and present the framework required to compute the stock of training and the internal 
rate of return to training. Section 3 describes our longitudinal dataset and Section 4 presents 
the results. The main conclusions are drawn in Section 5.  
 
2. Modelling 
2.1 The impact of training on productivity and wages  
Consider a Cobb-Douglas production function given by 
( ) ,                                                                                                    (1.1)Z ujt jtjt jt jt jtY AH K F e ηα β λ +=  
where Y  denotes the value added of firm j in period t, A is an efficiency parameter, H  is 
hours of work, and K  is the stock of capital. Z denotes the vector of firm characteristics, 
 
 
3
including the set of average characteristics of workers. F  is the number of hours of training, 
here treated as an additional input as in Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz (2006), for example. 
By dividing equation (1.1) by H, we obtain y, that is, the hourly productivity of labour, 
jty , given by: 
( )jt1 ,                                                                                               (1.2)jtZ ujt jt jt jty AH k f e ηα β λ β λ ++ + −=  
where k  denotes capital intensity and f the number of hours of training per hour of work.  
In logarithms, equation (1.2) becomes:  
  ( 1)    .                                   (1.3)jt jt jt jt jt jtLn y Ln A Ln H Ln k Ln f Z uα β λ β λ η= + + + − + + + +  
Following Hellerstein, Newmark and Troske (1999), Dearden, Reed and Reenen 
(2006) and Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz (2006), we use a common set of regressors in the 
(log) real wage and productivity specifications. Thus, using equation (1.3), we have the (log) 
hourly average wage of workers in firm j  in period t , jtLn s , given by:
1 
  ( 1)    .                             (1.4)jt s s s jt s jt jt s jt jtLn s Ln A Ln H Ln k Ln f Zα β ϕ β ϕ η μ= + + + − + + + +  
Similarly to λ  in model (1.3), ϕ  in model (1.4) is expected to be positive, which 
means that the investment in training leads to higher productivity and wages. Whether λ  is 
higher or lower than ϕ  is another matter to which we shall come below. 
 
2.2 Controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity 
The error term in equations (1.3) and (1.4) are not necessarily i.i.d. since they include 
the unobservable heterogeneity of firms and workers; and if there is correlation between 
observed and unobserved characteristics, the omission of relevant variables will certainly 
imply biased results in standard OLS regressions. 
                                                            
1 We note that a similar specification can be derived using a standard DGP for individual (log) earnings. Thus, if 
individual (worker) earnings are a function of individual and firm characteristics, it follows that the average 
wage at firm j will depend on average worker characteristics, on the one hand, and firm characteristics, on the 
other.  
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We treat this limitation by admitting that the error term in equation (1.4) is composed 
by an iid error term, jte , plus the unobserved firm fixed effect, jψ , that is: jt j jteμ ψ= + . 
Then, in matrix notation, (1.4) becomes: 2 
,                                                                                                                    (2.1)LS X G eθ ψ= + +  
with G  a JT J× matrix of dummies representing the set of firms (J is the number of firms in 
the sample) and 
11 11 11 11
12 12 12 12
 
1        
1
1        
* .
..........................................
1        
s
s s
s
JN JN JN JN
s
Ln A
Ln H Ln k Ln f Z
Ln H Ln k Ln f Z
X
Ln H Ln k Ln f Z
α β ϕ
θ β
ϕ
η
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥+ + −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 Multiplying (2.1) by MG, with G GM I P= −  and 1( )T TGP G G G G−= ,  we have: 
.                                                                                          (2.2)G G G GM LS M X M G M eθ ψ= + +
By definition 0GM Gψ = , which means we can obtain: 
$ ( ) ( )1 ,                                                                                                  (2.3)T TG GX M X X M LSθ −=  
and (using 2.1): 
  ( ) $( )1 ,                                                                                                    (2.4)T TG G G LS Xψ θ−= −
or 
( )^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^1   ( 1)    .   (2.4')T Tj s sjt s s s jt jt jt jtG G G Ln s Ln A Ln H Ln k Ln f Zψ α β ϕ β ϕ η− ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= − + + + − + + +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 
 Adding ˆ jψ  into (1.3), we finally have:   
ˆ  ( 1)    ,                        (2.5)jt jt jt jt jt j jtLn y Ln A Ln H Ln k Ln f Z uα β λ β λ η πψ= + + + − + + + + +
 
                                                            
2 A full derivation of this model is provided in Lopes e Teixeira (2009). To be precise, ˆ jψ  contains a firm 
specific effect plus an average (unobserved) worker effect. 
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while equation (1.4) becomes:     
^
  ( 1)    .                     (2.6)jjt s s s jt s jt jt s jt jtLn s Ln A Ln H Ln k Ln f Zψ α β ϕ β ϕ η μ− = + + + − + + + +  
  
2.3 The stock of training   
Let us consider the expression3 
( ) , 11 ,                                                                                                         (3.1)jt jt j tM F Mδ −= + −  
where the stock of training in firm j at the end of period t, jtM , is given by the amount of 
training offered in t, jtF , plus the stock of training at the end of period t-1, 1jtM − , adjusted by 
the depreciation rate, δ .   
 The introduction of δ  is grounded on two reasons: a) the mobility of workers (worker 
separation generates a loss of firm-specific training); and b) human capital obsolescence. 
These two aspects are difficult to measure, and, in particular, although we have information 
on firm separation rates, we do not know who actually quits the firm (that is, whether leavers 
are training recipients or not). Our treatment is therefore ad hoc, and, accordingly, we assume 
different scenarios to evaluate how the results are sensitive to changes in δ .4  To simplify, 
δ is also assumed constant across firms. 
 Using (3.1), we easily obtain:  
( ) ( ) ( )2, , , 1 , 2 ,1 + 1 +...+ 1 ,                                                       (3.2)lj t j t j t j t j t lM F F F Fδ δ δ− − −= + − − −  
where l  denotes the number of years of accumulated training.5   
In our dataset, we have longitudinal information on the percentage of training hours in 
total hours worked from 1995 to 1999. Further assuming that training before 1995 can be 
proxied by the 1995-1999 average, we have then, for t=1999 (or t=99): 
                                                            
3 For an identical approach see Boon and Eijken (1997) and Boon (2000). 
4 The benchmark depreciation rate is 35%: 20% due to worker separation and 15% to obsolescence (see Lillard 
and Tan (1986). 
5 Parameter l is proxied by firm age. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )4 5 5,99 ,99 ,98 ,951 +...+ 1 + 1 1 ... 1 ,        (3.3)lj j jj j j jM F F F F F Fδ δ δ δ δ −⎡ ⎤= + − − − + − + −⎣ ⎦
where 
1
1 T
j jt
t
F F
T =
= ∑ . T is the number of years in which the training variable is observed.  
Further manipulation of (3.3) yields: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )4 5 5,99 ,99 ,98 ,951 +...+ 1 + 1 1 1 ... 1 ,               (3.4)ljj j j jM F F F Fδ δ δ δ δ −⎡ ⎤= + − − − + − + + −⎣ ⎦
which, by considering the geometric series with common ratio ( )1 δ−  and initial value equal 
to 1, is equivalent to:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
5
4 5
,99 ,99 ,98 ,95
1 1
1 +...+ 1 + 1 .                                    (3.5)
1 1
l
jj j j jM F F F F
δδ δ δ δ
−⎛ ⎞− −= + − − − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠  
For t=98, we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
4
3 4
,98 ,98 ,97 ,95
1 1
1 +...+ 1 + 1 .                                    (3.6)
l
jj j j jM F F F F
δδ δ δ δ
−⎛ ⎞− −= + − − − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
We note that this approach allows us to solve for an important limitation in the 
literature. Indeed, since training is likely to be relatively more intense in periods of low output 
demand – that is, in periods where the foregone value of the time spent in training is low – 
OLS estimates of (2.2) are expected to underestimate the effects of training on productivity if 
the training variable in t is measured by its current (flow) level. By using the stock of training 
we can therefore reduce the corresponding bias.6 Accordingly, the estimate of the stock of 
training obtained using model (3.5) will be alternatively added to specifications (2.2) and 
(2.3).  
 
2.4 Training costs 
Following Frazis and Loewenstein (2005), we use the Box-Cox transformation to 
investigate the appropriate functional form for the direct costs of training. Accordingly, we 
specified the training cost as a function of ( )1 /F ρ ρ− , where F denotes the training variable, 
                                                            
6 Presumably, output demand/productivity shocks cannot be anticipated and hence training in t-i is not expected 
to be determined by productivity in t. 
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and obtained ˆ 0.09ρ = , estimated by non-linear least squares. Given this evidence, we 
selected the following training cost function: 
0   ,                                                                                     (4.1)
F
jt jt c jt jtLn C Ln Ln F Zτ τ η υ= + + +
where FjtC  denotes the direct training costs in firm j in period t and Z is the vector of firm 
characteristics. τ  gives the elasticity of direct training costs with respect to hours of training. 
 To compute the foregone value of production arising from the fact that workers may 
receive training during working hours, we return to equation (1.1):7 
( )                                                                                            Z uY AH K F e ηα β λ +=  
which is equivalent to  
( )[ ( )] ,                                                                                                      (4.2)Z uY A H F K F e ηα β λ +=
where the negative and indirect effect of training on value added is obtained via the 
[ ( )]H F α term.  
Thus, from (4.2), we have: 
,                                                                                                                 (4.3)Y dH Y dH
H dF H dF
α∂ =∂  
where Y H
H Y
α ∂≡ ∂  indicates the elasticity of production (value added) with respect to hours. 
 Based on (4.3), the derivative dH
dF
 gives the relationship between hours worked and 
training hours, which is assumed to be negative as an increase in training hours lowers the 
number of hours spent in production. However, training does not necessarily take place 
during standard hours, and therefore the effect of training on hours is given by 
( ),RH F
F
Δ = −Δ  where R  denotes the number of hours subtracted from production due to 
training ( R F≤ ). Thus, making dH H R
dF F F
Δ≈ = −Δ  we have 
.                                                                                                  (4.4)Y dH Y R R y
H dF H F H f
α α∂ = =∂  
                                                            
7 Subscripts j and t are omitted. 
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Given that for more than one half of the firms in the sample the training hours are less than 
0.4% of total hours (which implies a small R H  for the great majority of firms), the indirect 
costs of training are in practice a small proportion of value added. 
 
2.5 The internal rate of return to training (from the perspective of the firm)  
In order to estimate the internal rate of return, we assume that training takes place in t, 
while productivity and the wage gains occur in the post-training period up to period n. 
Training costs are assumed to be paid in t.8 
Let us assume then that  
1
,                                                                                                             (5.1)
(1 )
n
t i
ti
i
NMgB MgC
r
+
=
=+∑
where NMgB  is the marginal benefit of one additional hour of training, net of the possible 
wage increase obtained by workers. MgC  is the increase in total costs (direct and indirect) 
resulting from an additional hour of training and r  indicates the internal rate of return. 
We further assume that NMgB  is obtained by subtracting the marginal increase in 
wages from the marginal product arising from one additional hour of training, that is:9 
1 1 1
1 1 .                                                                  (5.2)
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
n n n
t i t i t i
i i i
i i it t
NMgB Y S
r r F r F
+ + +
= = =
∂ ∂= −+ + ∂ + ∂∑ ∑ ∑  
Using (1.1) and replacing tF  by tM (with tM given by equation 3.2), we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 ˆ1 21 + 1 +...+ 1 .                                 (5.3)t tl Z ut t t t t t t lY AH K F F F F eλ η πψα β δ δ δ + +− − −⎡ ⎤= + − − −⎣ ⎦
 Then, differentiating (5.3) with respect to t iF −  we have: 
(1 ) (1 ) ,                                                                                       (5.4)i it t t
t i t t
Y Y y
F M m
λ δ λ δ
−
∂ = − = −∂  
                                                            
8 This notation follows Almeida and Carneiro (2009), with a major departure: the marginal benefit is net of the 
wage increase obtained by workers. 
9 We also make t i t i
t t
Y Y
F F
+ +∂ Δ≅
∂ Δ
 and t i t i
t t
S S
F F
+ +∂ Δ
∂ Δ
≅ . 
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where tm  denotes the ratio between the accumulated number of training hours and (total) 
hours worked. Similarly to equation (5.4) we assume (1 )it i t
t t
Y y
F m
λ δ+∂ = −∂ , while for wages we 
have  (1 )it i t
t t
S s
F m
ϕ δ+∂ = −∂ .
10 Thus, the present discounted value of net marginal benefits is 
given by: 
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )... ... ,           (5.5)
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
n nn
t i t t t t
i n n
i t t t t
NMgB y y s s
r r m r m r m r m
δ δ δ δλ λ ϕ ϕ+
=
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − − −= + + − + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ + + + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑
which is equivalent to  
1
(1 ) (1 )... .                                                                (5.6)
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
nn
t i t t
i n
i t t
NMgB y s
r m m r r
δ δλ ϕ+
=
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− −= − + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∑  
 Now, (1 ) (1 )...
(1 ) (1 )
n
nr r
δ δ⎛ ⎞− −+ +⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠  is a geometric series with n terms, common ratio 
1
1 r
δ−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠  and initial value 
1
1 r
δ−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ , which yields: 
11
1 1 11 = 1 .                                                                    (5.7)11 11
1
n
nr
r r r
r
δ
δ δ δ
δ δ
⎛ ⎞−⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎛ ⎞− − −+⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠−⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠  
 Since n is unknown, we will analyse two scenarios, given by n=1 and n →+∞ . In the 
first case, (5.7) becomes: 
1 1 11 ,                                                                                                  (5.8)
1 1r r r
δ δ δ
δ
− ⎛ − ⎞ −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
while in the second case we have: 
1 1 11 .                                                                                               (5.9)
1r r r
δ δ δ
δ δ
+∞⎛ ⎞− − −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
Finally, (5.8) and (5.9) are alternatively replaced in (5.6) to obtain the present discount 
value of net marginal benefits for firms. 
We recall that total training costs contain direct costs and foregone output. The direct 
marginal costs of training can be obtained using (4.1), so that:  
                                                            
10 We recall that, using (2.3), ϕ  gives the elasticity of (log) average wage with respect to hours of training. 
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.                                                                                                                       (5.10)
F F
t t
t t
C C
F F
τ∂ =∂  
In turn, to obtain the marginal (indirect) cost we use (4.4).  
Thus, for n=1, we have: 
1 ,                                                                             (5.11)
1
F
t t t t t
t t t t t
y s C R y
m m r F H f
δλ ϕ τ α⎛ ⎞ −⎛ ⎞− = +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
or, 
1 ,                                                                       (5.12)
1
F
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
y s C y R y
m m r Y f H f
δλ ϕ τ α⎛ ⎞ −⎛ ⎞− = +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
which is equivalent to 
( ) ( )1 ,                                                                                     (5.13)1t ty y tt t
ms c w
r f
δλ ϕ τ α−⎛ ⎞− = +⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠  
if one assumes 
t
y t
t
ss
y
= ; 
t
F
y t
t
Cc
Y
=  and 
t
t
t
Rw
H
= . 
By further manipulating (5.13) we can then obtain a general formula for the internal 
rate of return for the case n=1: 
( )( )
( )
1
-1.                                                                                                       (5.14)t
t
y
y t
t
t
s
r mc w
f
λ ϕ δ
τ α
− −=
+
 If, alternatively, n →+∞ , we have: 
( ) ( )1 ,                                                                                   (5.15)t ty y tt
t
ms c w
r f
δλ ϕ τ αδ
−⎛ ⎞− = +⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠  
or 
( )( )
( )
1
- .                                                                                                       (5.16)t
t
y
y t
t
t
s
r mc w
f
λ ϕ δ δ
τ α
− −=
+
 
The expressions (5.14) and (5.16) show that the internal rate of return to training 
depends directly on the elasticity of value added with respect to training hours – the “gross 
gain” – and, inversely, on (a) the direct costs, (b) the foregone output, (c) the wage gains, and 
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(d) the depreciation rate. Since, by definition, the depreciation rate is less than one, the 
internal rate of return r in (5.16) is always higher than in (5.14). 
 
2.6 The internal rate of return for workers 
 Given the nature of workplace training, we can easily assume that all direct training 
costs are fully paid by employers. On the other hand, we preclude the possibility of any wage 
reduction during the training period. In any case, training is not ‘free’ for workers if they 
sacrifice leisure time. Since the marginal utility of an additional hour of leisure is 
unobservable, we will use as a proxy the compensation of an additional hour of work.  
Let us take sα  as the elasticity of the average wage with respect to hours of work so 
that we have: 
.                                                                                                                          (6.1)t ts
t t
S S
H H
α∂ =∂
Then, by multiplying the right-hand-side of (6.1) by ( )t t
t
F R
F
− , we obtain the indirect costs of 
an additional hour of training from the perspective of the worker, that is: 
( ) ,                                                                                                         (6.2)t t t ts s t
t t t
S F R sv
H F f
α α− =
with ( )t tt
t
F Rv
H
−= . 
On the other hand, the marginal benefits of training, LMgB , are given by:  
1
(1 ) (1 )... ,                                                                  (6.3)
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
L nn
t i t
i n
i L t L L
MgB s
r m r r
δ δϕ+
=
⎛ ⎞− −= + +⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠∑  
where Lr  is the internal rate of return to training for workers. 
Using (6.2) and (6.3) and following the procedure described in section 2.5, Lr  is given 
by: 
( )1 -1,                                                                                                                     (6.4)L
t
s t
t
r mv
f
ϕ δ
α
−=
in the case of n=1, and by 
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( )1 - ,                                                                                                                       (6.5)L
t
s t
t
r mv
f
ϕ δ δ
α
−=
if n →+∞ . 
Thus, the internal rate of return Lr  depends directly on the elasticity of the hourly 
wage with respect to the proportion of hours spent in training (ϕ ) and indirectly on the 
depreciation rate (δ ), and the opportunity cost ( s tvα ). As expected, the higher the percentage 
of training hours taken during working hours, the higher is the return to training for workers. 
 
 
3. The Data 
Our raw data is provided by Balanço Social, a dataset collected by Gabinete de 
Estudos e Planeamento (GEP) of the Ministry of Labour, Portugal. In particular, we will use 
two data points – 1998 and 1999 – covering 1,497 ‘training’ firms. All firms in the sample 
have at least 100 employees, representing approximately 30% of the total Portuguese business 
sector workforce. 
Balanço Social provides detailed information on a number of relevant variables for our 
study: value added, capital depreciation, labor costs, the wage bill, number of employees, 
hours of work, location, sectoral activity, and the legal form. The data basis also includes 
information on average characteristics of workers, namely age, gender, schooling, tenure, skill 
and the proportion of part-time workers. 
A unique feature of Balanço Social is that it contains detailed information on training, 
namely the number of participants (by occupation level) and the number of training hours by 
type (on-the-job and off-the-job training). In addition, Balanço Social provides information 
on direct and indirect costs of training, the latter being directly obtained by the proportion 
R
H  on the total wage bill. 
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As shown in Table 1, which summarizes the main descriptive training statistics, the 
proportion of training hours (on- and off-the-job) is approximately 1% of total hours of work, 
with most of the training hours taking place during normal working hours. On average, each 
worker spends approximately 18 hours per year in training, 29% of which in off-the-job 
training.  However, as one might expect, the dispersion across firms in the sample is very 
high, with more than one half offering less than 8 hours of training per employee. 
Heterogeneity within firms is also quite substantial, with 95% of top managers and 
professionals participating in training, for example, while only 13% of unskilled workers are 
training participants. 
Training costs amount to 1.7% of total value added, 47% of which are related to the 
off-the-job training category. Direct costs represents, on average, 0.87% of total value added. 
(This information is not reported in the table.) 
Table 2 presents the mean and standard deviation of an extended set of firm-level 
variables grouped in two categories: firms with training hours above and below the median, 
respectively. Quite clearly, firms with a higher training intensity have a higher productivity 
level and higher wages. They are also larger in terms of size (employment) and skills. 
 
4. Results and interpretation  
4.1 The Impact of Training on Productivity and Wages  
The results obtained from model (2.5) are presented in Table 3, column (1). The R2 
coefficient indicates that the model explains more than 60% of the variation in firm 
productivity. The parameter ( 1α β λ+ + − ) is negative and statistically significant (at 0.1 
level) which points to the presence of a decreasing returns to scale technology. In turn, the 
elasticity of (log) value added with respect to hours is equal to 0.72.11 
                                                            
11 Using the results in Table 3, we have 1 0.055 1 0.211 0.017 0.055 0.717α β λ α+ + − = − ⇔ = − − − = . 
 
 
14
The impact of training on value added per hour is given by the training variable 
coefficient. Accordingly, if firms decide, for instance, to double the number of hours per 
worker – an increase from 1% to 2%, or a 18 hours of additional training – then the 
productivity will increase by 1.7%. In turn, 10 hours of additional training (per worker) will 
increase productivity by 0.9%. These effects compare with Almeida and Carneiro (2009), 
who claim that 10 additional hours of training per worker imply a 0.6-1.3% increase in 
productivity.12 
Column (2) of Table 3 gives model (2.6) estimates, and as it is apparent the higher the 
proportion of training hours in total hours, the higher the (average) wage. This result suggests 
that workers do capture some of the gains from firm training. However, since the coefficient 
of the training variable in column (2) is smaller than the coefficient in column (1), it is clear 
that firms are grabbing a bigger slice of the pie. 
As shown by Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz (2006), one can derive a quick measure of 
the percentage captured by workers and firms: if the gross (marginal) gain associated with an 
additional hour of training is given by dY Y
dF F
λ= , and the (marginal) wage gain is given by 
dS S
dF F
ϕ= , then the worker and firm shares are given by 
S
F
Y
F
ϕ
λ
 (or
ysϕ
λ ) and  
( )ysλ ϕ
λ
−
, 
respectively. 
Using these formulae, and assuming ys = 0.37, λ = 1.7%, and ϕ =1.5%, the worker 
share is 32.6%, while the firm share is 67.4%.  These estimates compare easily with those 
obtained by Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz (2006), who found, for Sweden, a worker share 
equal to 0.33. 
It is interesting to note that the proportion of the gains captured by workers from firm-
supplied training is substantially larger than in the case of a firm investment in capital, for 
                                                            
12 We note that if unobserved firm heterogeneity is ignored, the training coefficient becomes much higher, at 
0.026 vis-à-vis 0.017. 
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example. In this case, the corresponding worker share is given by 
y
ssβ
β , which implies a 
worker share of 4.2%.13 In contrast, schooling implies a worker share of roughly 50%. This 
result is not surprising at all given the general content (or portability) of the investment in 
formal education. 
Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the estimated stock of training hours, 
obtained by using the model presented in section 2.3. The average proportion of the stock of 
training in the total hours is 2.6%, which is 2.36 times higher than the ratio of the training 
hours flow to total hours. We also note that our modelling in section 2.3 seems to be quite 
robust as the correlation between the stock of training, obtained by considering a depreciation 
rate of 10%, and the training stock implied by a depreciation rate of 35% is 0.9608. On the 
other hand, if equation ( ) ( )
5
5 1 11 0
l
jF
δδ δ
−⎛ ⎞− −− =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 in (3.5) holds – which is equivalent to 
ignoring the initial stock of training – the coefficient of correlation will be equal to 0.9973.14   
Columns (3) and (4) from Table 3 replicate columns (1) and (2) using the estimated 
stock of training hours rather than the flow of training hours. The corresponding depreciation 
rate is 35%. As it is apparent, there is a modest increase in the impact of training both on 
productivity and wages which means that endogeneity of the training variable does not seem 
to be much of a problem.15  
 
4.2 The determinants of the training costs 
Table 5 presents the results from model (4.1). The coefficient of the training variable 
indicates that if firms, for example, double the intensity of training, the direct training costs 
will increase by 62%, showing an inelastic relationship between costs and training intensity. 
                                                            
13 In Sweden, according to Ballot, Fakhfakh and Taymaz (2006), 
y
ssβ
β  is equal to 7%. 
14 This is of course due to the fact that training obtained before 1995 is virtually negligible for a depreciation rate 
of 35%. 
15 As a matter of fact, we do not find any statistically significant correlation between aggregate sectoral 
productivity shocks and the training flow in a given year. 
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Capital intensity, size, ownership and the proportion of skilled workers have also a 
statistically significant impact on direct costs. 
As mentioned earlier, the indirect costs of training are based on the estimated foregone 
output. Balanço Social gives a straightforward measure based on the product of R H  times 
the total wage bill. Since the productivity gains are not necessarily mirrored into higher 
wages, we decided to compute the foregone production by using the model developed in 
section 2.4. Thus, using the right-hand-side of (5.11) – and the sample means – we obtain an 
estimate of the percentage of indirect training costs in total training costs at 53.4%, that is: 
0.717*0.89= 0.534,
0.62*0.9 0.717*0.89
t t t
t t t
F F
t t t t t
t t t t t
R y R
H f H
C R y C R
F H f Y H
α α
τ α τ α
= =⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ++ +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
  
which seems to be a quite reasonable proportion, especially if we take into consideration that 
the estimate provided by Balanço Social, given by the (implicit) wage costs, is equal to 40%. 
 
4.3 Estimates of the Internal Rate of Return 
Since we do not observe how long the benefits of training will last, two extreme cases 
are next considered: in the first, we admit that benefits from firm training are totally 
exhausted after period t+1 (the n=1 case); in the second, the stream of benefits is, say, forever 
(the n →+∞  case).  
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics of the estimated internal rate of return, r, 
obtained by using (5.14) – for 1n = – and (5.16) – for n →+∞ . In the 1n =   case, and 
assuming a depreciation rate of 35%, the mean of r is 43%. In this scenario, almost 66% of 
training firms have a negative internal rate of return as shown in Figure 1. There is also an 
obvious high dispersion in the distribution of r, which is due to (raw) firm heterogeneity as 
shown in Table 2, where the dispersion of firm productivity is quite substantial.  
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As expected, the mean of r is higher in the n →+∞  case, at 108%. The proportion of 
firms with a negative internal rate is also substantially smaller, at 34%, as shown in Figure 2. 
(If we assume that the benefits of training begin in the training period, the percentage of firms 
with a positive internal rate of return becomes obviously higher.) In turn, using the alternative 
value of 10% for the depreciation rate and assuming n →+∞ , the internal rate of return 
would be positive for 90% of the firms. For the n=1 case, we observe a positive internal rate 
for 55% of all firms in the sample.  
We can also derive an aggregate internal rate of return using sample means. In this 
case, model (5.15) yields:16  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
0.018 0.017*0.37 *0.65
0.018 0.017*0.37 0.62*0.009 0.717*0.0089 *2.36
( 0.35)
0.00760.01171 0.0282 0.1106,
0.35
y y y ms s c w
r f
r
r
r
δλ ϕ λ ϕ τ αδ
−⎛ ⎞− + − = + ⇔⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
−⇔ − + = + ⇔+
⇔ + = ⇔ =+  
 which is similar to the result obtained by Almeida and Carneiro (2009), at 8.9%.  
Finally, in Table 7, we present the summary statistics for the internal rate of return 
from the perspective of the worker. Values are obtained by applying models (6.4) and (6.5) to 
a sample of firms in which the ratio tv  , given by 
( )t t
t
F R
H
− , is greater than 0.01%. For n=1, 
the average internal rate of return for workers is approximately 60%. For n →+∞ , the 
average internal rate is much higher, at 125%. Similarly to the returns for firms, using sample 
means we obtain a substantially smaller internal rate of return for workers, at 24%. 
 
                                                            
16 Assuming that the benefits begin in the training period. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper we derive a firm-level productivity (and wage) model as a function of 
workplace training. The results from our model specifications indicate that the investment in 
training has a positive and statistically significant impact both on productivity and wages of 
training firms. In particular, it is estimated that an additional hour of training per worker 
implies 0.09% increase in productivity. Moreover, our estimates indicate that 2/3 of the gains 
in productivity are captured by firms and 1/3 by workers. 
We also derived a general model for the internal rate of return to training that takes 
into account the direct and indirect costs of training. Considering, again, the subset of training 
firms, and assuming a depreciation rate of 35%, the internal rate of return, at sample means, is 
11%.  
As expected, the greater the length of the post-training period, the higher the 
proportion of firms with a positive internal rate of return. In particular, under the limiting case 
that training benefits are exhausted just one period after training, the investment is positive for 
roughly 1/3 of the firms. For a longer stream of benefits, more than 2/3 of all firms have a 
positive internal rate of return, which of course suggests that excessive firm mobility, or a low 
rate of firm survival, may be counterproductive and generate underinvestment in formal firm 
training. Training is good for workers too. Taking the same subset of firms, the internal rate 
of return at sample means is 24% for workers, which is roughly twice as much as the return 
for firms. These are all non-negligible gains that should perhaps encourage policy makers to 
treat formal training as a good value for money. 
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Table 1: Selected summary statistics of firm-provided training, 1998-1999 
 
Variable 
On-the-job 
training 
(1) 
Off-the-job 
training 
 (2) 
Training  
(On- and off-the-job) 
(3) 
Training hours per hour of work 0.008 (0.025) 0.003 (0.010) 0.011 (0.028) 
Percentage of training hours on hours 
worked 
n.a. n.a. 0.829 (0.310) 
Training hours per worker  12.83 (39.06) 5.32 (14.76) 18.16 (43.74) 
Percentage of training costs in total 
value added  
1% (1.85%) 0.8% (1.72%) 1.7% (2.74%) 
Number of observations  
Number of firms 
2,292 
1,497 
2,292 
1,497 
2,292 
1,497 
Notes: The reported means were computed from a sample containing only firms that have provided some 
training in the sample period. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics by type of  firm 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Firms with training hours 
above the median 
(1)  
Firms with training hours 
below the median  
(2) 
Productivity 36.06 (142.09) 16.94 (46.08) 
Hourly wage 5.95 (4.1) 5.25 (5.82) 
Capital 0.94 (1.52) 0.52 (0.73) 
Hours (per worker) 1,747.24 (236.39) 1,798 (258.24) 
Number of workers 591.6 (1,383.72) 341.5 (490.45) 
Schooling  0.373 (0.267) 0.235 (0.204) 
Tenure 0.396 (0.276) 0.366 (0.255) 
Age   0.581 (0.139) 0.574 (0.126) 
Gender (male) 0.648 (0.236) 0.629 (0.282) 
Top managers and professionals 0.080 (0.098) 0.050 (0.058) 
Other managers and professionals 0.082 (0.096) 0.051 (0.086) 
 Foremen and supervisors 0.061 (0.063) 0.064 (0.062) 
Highly skilled and skilled personnel 0.448 (0.234) 0.422 (0.250) 
 Semiskilled personnel 0.204 (0.219) 0.231 (0.232) 
Unskilled personnel 0.088 (0.153) 0.137 (0.188) 
Full-time workers 0.908 (0.111) 0.873 (0.137) 
Fixed-term contract workers 0.10 (0.137) 0.12 (0.222) 
Foreign ownership  0.264 (0.412) 0.1643 (0.356) 
Number of observations  1,220 1,035 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the mean and standard deviations of the corresponding variables by training 
intensity. The median is 0.4%. The description of variables is presented in Appendix Table A1. 
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Table 3: The impact of training on firm productivity and wages 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables  
Training measured in the 
current year 
Training measured in the current 
and in previous years 
Productivity  
(1) 
Wages  
(2) 
Productivity  
(3) 
Wages  
(4) 
Training 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.017 
 (1.81) (3.51) (1.84) (3.86) 
Capital  0.211 0.024 0.210 0.021 
 (16.98) (4.39) (14.65) (3.36) 
 Hours  -0.055 -0.046 -0.044 -0.054 
 (-2.13) (-3.93) (-1.57) (-4.35) 
Schooling  0.249 0.303 0.349 0.250 
 (2.46) (6.69) (2.74) (4.44) 
Tenure 0.183 0.398 0.088 0.332 
 (2.30) (11.19) (0.98) (8.34) 
Age 0.310 0.181 0.057 0.107 
 (2.19) (2.85) (0.34) (1.45) 
Gender (male) 0.210 0.118 0.299 0.170 
 (2.59) (3.23) (3.36) (4.29) 
Top managers and professionals 1.037 0.630 0.951 0.595 
 (4.20) (5.68) (3.37) (4.76) 
Other managers and professionals -0.072 0.432 -0.048 0.399 
 (-0.36) (4.76) (-0.18) (3.42) 
Foremen and supervisors 0.131 0.172 -0.304 -0.219 
 (0.53) (1.55) (-0.93) (-1.51) 
Highly skilled and skilled personnel 0.172 0.169 0.119 0.082 
 (1.73) (3.78) (1.07) (1.67) 
Semiskilled personnel 0.089 0.145 0.071 0.093 
 (0.85) (3.08) (0.60) (1.78) 
Productivity bonus 0.107 -0.316 0.194 -0.238 
 (1.40) (-9.22) (2.06) (-5.72) 
Full-time workers 0.288 0.082 0.229 0.065 
 (2.14) (1.36) (1.66) (1.07) 
Fixed-term contract workers 0.074 0.107 0.028 0.026 
 (0.94) (3.01) (0.24) (0.49) 
Foreign ownership 0.102 0.048 0.058 0.068 
 (2.97) (3.09) (1.52) (4.07) 
Medium/large firm  0.063 0.060 0.047 0.056 
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 (1.47) (3.11) (1.04) (2.78) 
Norte -0.092 -0.116 -0.074 -0.121 
 (-2.43) (-6.83) (-1.78) (-6.59) 
Centro -0.197 -0.129 -0.221 -0.174 
 (-3.83) (-5.62) (-4.16) (-7.40) 
Alentejo -0.306 -0.130 -0.243 -0.073 
 (-2.62) (-2.47) (-1.67) (-7.40) 
Algarve -0.128 -0.084 0.051 -0.005 
 (-0.98) (-1.44) (0.38) (-0.08) 
Firm unobserved heterogeneity 0.968  0.992  
 (14.00)  (11.92)  
Number of observations 1,834 1,834 1,400 1,400 
F-statistic 51.372 97.33 45.149 90.601 
2R  0.6093 0.7471 0.6354 0.7777 
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) present the estimates from model (2.5), while columns (2) and (4) present the 
estimates from model (2.6). The model includes a constant, 27 industry dummies, and 2 dummies flagging the 
legal form of the firm. The t-statistics are given in parentheses. The description of variables is presented in 
Appendix Table A1. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics for the stock of training 
 
Minimum 0.00003 
Maximum 0.397 
Mean 0.026 
Median 0.015 
Standard deviation 0.039 
Number of observations 1,400 
Notes: The reported statistics were computed from a sample containing only firms that have provided some 
training in the sample period. The selected depreciation rate is 35%. 
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Table 5: The determinants of training costs 
 
Variables Direct Cost of Training (1) 
   Training 0.623 
 (35.04) 
   Capital 0.158 
 (5.32) 
    Hours 0.353 
 (6.71) 
Schooling  0.758 
 (4.03) 
Tenure -0.144 
 (-0.99) 
Age -0.393 
 (-1.54) 
Gender (male) 0.204 
 (1.35) 
  Top managers and professionals 0.635 
 (1.42) 
  Other managers and professionals 1.148 
 (3.14) 
  Foremen and supervisors 0.788 
 (1.75) 
  Highly skilled and skilled personnel 0.513 
 (2.85) 
  Semiskilled personnel 0.364 
 (1.92) 
Productivity bonus -0.199 
 (-1.98) 
 Full-time workers 0.081 
 (0.33) 
Fixed-term contract workers -0.094 
 (-0.64) 
Foreign ownership 0.119 
 (1.83) 
Medium/large firm  0.198 
 (2.44) 
Norte -0.166 
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 (-2.39) 
Centro -0.123 
 (-1.30) 
Alentejo  -0.027 
 (-0.12) 
Algarve 0.372 
 (1.57) 
Firm unobserved heterogeneity 0.760 
 (5.95) 
Number of observations 1,975 
F-statistic 60.69 
2R  0.6158 
Notes: Column (1) corresponds to model (4.1). See notes to Table 3. 
 
 
Table 6: Summary statistics of the internal rate of return to training (firm’s perspective) 
 n = 1 n →+∞  
Mean 0.425 1.075 
Median -0.543 0.107 
Standard deviation 3.877 3.877 
Number of observations 841 841 
 
 
Table 7: Summary statistics of the internal rate of return to training (worker’s perspective) 
 1n =  n →+∞  
Mean 0.602 1.252 
Median 0.133 0.783 
Standard deviation 1.486 1.486 
Number of observations (firm-year) 159 159 
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Figure 1: The distribution of the internal rate of return for firms ( 1n = ) 
34%
66%
r>0
r<0
 
 
 
Figure 2: The distribution of the internal rate of return for firms ( n →+∞ ) 
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34%
r>0
r<0
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Appendix Table A1: Description of Variables (at firm level) 
Variable   Definition   
Training  (Log) Hours of training per hour of work.  
Productivity Value added per hour of work. 
Hourly wage The wage bill (total earnings) divided by hours of work. 
Capital (Log) Capital stock per hour of work. The stock of capital is 
proxied by the annual volume of capital depreciation.  
Hours   (Log) Number of contractual (standard) hours. 
Schooling Proportion of workers with at least a high-school degree. 
Tenure Proportion of workers with 10 or more years of service. 
Age Proportion of workers between 25 and 40 years old. 
Gender (male) Proportion of male workers. 
Top managers and professionals  Proportion of top managers and professionals. 
Other managers and professionals Proportion of other managers and professionals. 
Foremen and supervisors  Proportion of foremen and supervisors. 
Highly skilled and skilled personnel Proportion of highly skilled and skilled personnel. 
Semiskilled personnel Proportion of semiskilled personnel. 
Unskilled personnel Proportion of unskilled personnel. 
Norte/Centro/Lisboa e Vale do 
Tejo/Alentejo/Algarve 
Dummy: 1 if the firm is located in Norte/Centro/Lisboa e Vale do 
Tejo/Alentejo/Algarve; 0 otherwise. 
Productivity bonus  Ratio between non-standard compensation and basic earnings. 
Full-time workers Proportion of full-time workers. 
Fixed-term contract workers Proportion of fixed-term contract workers. 
Foreign ownership Dummy: 1 if the firm is owned partial or totally by foreigners; 0 
otherwise. 
Medium/large firm Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is more than 250; 0 
otherwise. 
 
ESTUDOS DO G.E.M.F. 
(Available  on-line at http://gemf.fe.uc.pt) 
 
2010-05 Productivity, wages, and the returns to firm-provided training: who is grabbing the biggest 
share? 
- Ana Sofia Lopes & Paulino Teixeira 
2010-04 Health Status Determinants in the OECD Countries. A Panel Data Approach with 
Endogenous Regressors 
- Ana Poças & Elias Soukiazis 
2010-03 Employment, exchange rates and labour market rigidity 
- Fernando Alexandre, Pedro Bação, João Cerejeira & Miguel Portela 
2010-02 Slip Sliding Away: Further Union Decline in Germany and Britain 
- John T. Addison, Alex Bryson, Paulino Teixeira & André Pahnke 
2010-01 The Demand for Excess Reserves in the Euro Area and the Impact of the Current Credit 
Crisis  
- Fátima Teresa Sol Murta & Ana Margarida Garcia 
  
2009-16 The performance of the European Stock Markets: a time-varying Sharpe ratio approach  
- José A. Soares da Fonseca 
2009-15 Exchange Rate Mean Reversion within a Target Zone: Evidence from a Country on the 
Periphery of the ERM 
- António Portugal Duarte, João Sousa Andrade & Adelaide Duarte 
2009-14 The Extent of Collective Bargaining and Workplace Representation: Transitions between 
States and their Determinants. A Comparative Analysis of Germany and Great Britain 
- John T. Addison, Alex Bryson, Paulino Teixeira, André Pahnke & Lutz Bellmann 
2009-13 How well the balance-of- payments constraint approach explains the Portuguese growth 
performance. Empirical evidence for the 1965-2008 period 
- Micaela Antunes & Elias Soukiazis 
2009-12 Atypical Work: Who Gets It, and Where Does It Lead? Some U.S. Evidence Using the 
NLSY79 
- John T. Addison, Chad Cotti & Christopher J. Surfield 
2009-11 The PIGS, does the Group Exist? An empirical macroeconomic analysis based on the Okun 
Law 
- João Sousa Andrade 
2009-10 A Política Monetária do BCE. Uma estratégia original para a estabilidade nominal 
- João Sousa Andrade 
2009-09 Wage Dispersion in a Partially Unionized Labor Force  
- John T. Addison, Ralph W. Bailey & W. Stanley Siebert 
2009-08 Employment and exchange rates: the role of openness and technology 
- Fernando Alexandre, Pedro Bação, João Cerejeira & Miguel Portela 
2009-07 Channels of transmission of inequality to growth: A survey of the theory and evidence from 
a Portuguese perspective 
- Adelaide Duarte & Marta Simões 
2009-06 No Deep Pockets: Some stylized results on firms' financial constraints 
- Filipe Silva & Carlos Carreira 
2009-05 Aggregate and sector-specific exchange rate indexes for the Portuguese economy 
- Fernando Alexandre, Pedro Bação, João Cerejeira & Miguel Portela 
2009-04 Rent Seeking at Plant Level: An Application of the Card-De La Rica Tenure Model to 
Workers in German Works Councils  
- John T. Addison, Paulino Teixeira & Thomas Zwick 
2009-03 Unobserved Worker Ability, Firm Heterogeneity, and the Returns to Schooling and Training 
- Ana Sofia Lopes & Paulino Teixeira 
2009-02 Worker Directors: A German Product that Didn’t Export? 
- John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel 
Estudos do GEMF 
 
2009-01 Fiscal and Monetary Policies in a Keynesian Stock-flow Consistent Model 
- Edwin Le Heron 
  
2008-08  Uniform Price Market and Behaviour Pattern: What does the Iberian Electricity Market 
Point Out  
- Vítor Marques, Isabel Soares & Adelino Fortunato 
2008-07 The partial adjustment factors of FTSE 100 stock index and stock index futures: The 
informational impact of electronic trading systems 
- Helder M. C. V. Sebastião 
2008-06 Water Losses and Hydrographical Regions Influence on the Cost Structure of the 
Portuguese Water Industry 
- Rita Martins, Fernando Coelho& Adelino Fortunato 
2008-05 The Shadow of Death: Analysing the Pre-Exit Productivity of Portuguese Manufacturing 
Firms 
- Carlos Carreira & Paulino Teixeira 
2008-04 A Note on the Determinants and Consequences of Outsourcing Using German Data 
- John T. Addison, Lutz Bellmann, André Pahnke & Paulino Teixeira 
2008-03 Exchange Rate and Interest Rate Volatility in a Target Zone: The Portuguese Case 
- António Portugal Duarte, João Sousa Andrade & Adelaide Duarte 
2008-02 Taylor-type rules versus optimal policy in a Markov-switching economy 
- Fernando Alexandre, Pedro Bação & Vasco Gabriel 
2008-01 Entry and exit as a source of aggregate productivity growth in two alternative 
technological regimes 
- Carlos Carreira & Paulino Teixeira 
  
2007-09 Optimal monetary policy with a regime-switching exchange rate in a forward-looking 
model 
- Fernando Alexandre, Pedro Bação & John Driffill 
2007-08 Estrutura económica, intensidade energética e emissões de CO2: Uma abordagem  
Input-Output 
- Luís Cruz & Eduardo Barata 
2007-07 The Stability and Growth Pact, Fiscal Policy Institutions, and Stabilization in Europe 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
2007-06 The Consumption-Wealth Ratio Under Asymmetric Adjustment 
- Vasco J. Gabriel, Fernando Alexandre & Pedro Bação 
2007-05 European Integration and External Sustainability of the European Union An application of 
the thesis of Feldstein-Horioka 
- João Sousa Andrade 
2007-04 Uma Aplicação da Lei de Okun em Portugal 
- João Sousa Andrade 
2007-03 Education and growth: an industry-level analysis of the Portuguese manufacturing sector 
- Marta Simões & Adelaide Duarte 
2007-02 Levels of education, growth and policy complementarities 
- Marta Simões & Adelaide Duarte 
2007-01 Internal and External Restructuring over the Cycle: A Firm-Based Analysis of Gross Flows 
and Productivity Growth in Portugal 
- Carlos Carreira & Paulino Teixeira 
  
2006-09 Cost Structure of the Portuguese Water Industry: a Cubic Cost Function Application 
- Rita Martins, Adelino Fortunato & Fernando Coelho 
2006-08 The Impact of Works Councils on Wages 
- John T. Addison, Paulino Teixeira & Thomas Zwick 
2006-07 Ricardian Equivalence, Twin Deficits, and the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle in Egypt 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
Estudos do GEMF 
 
2006-06 L’intégration des marchés financiers 
- José Soares da Fonseca 
2006-05 The Integration of European Stock Markets and Market Timing 
- José Soares da Fonseca 
2006-04 Mobilidade do Capital e Sustentabilidade Externa – uma aplicação da tese de F-H a 
Portugal (1910-2004) 
- João Sousa Andrade 
2006-03 Works Councils, Labor Productivity and Plant Heterogeneity: First Evidence from Quantile 
Regressions 
- Joachim Wagner, Thorsten Schank, Claus Schnabel & John T. Addison 
2006-02 Does the Quality of Industrial Relations Matter for the Macroeconomy? A Cross-Country 
Analysis Using Strikes Data 
- John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira 
2006-01 Monte Carlo Estimation of Project Volatility for Real Options Analysis 
- Pedro Manuel Cortesão Godinho 
  
2005-17 On the Stability of the Wealth Effect 
- Fernando Alexandre, Pedro Bação & Vasco J. Gabriel 
2005-16 Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates 
- John T. Addison, C. R. Barrett & W. S. Siebert 
2005-15 Horizontal Differentiation and the survival of Train and Coach modes in medium range 
passenger transport, a welfare analysis comprising economies of scope and scale  
- Adelino Fortunato & Daniel Murta 
 
2005-14 ‘Atypical Work’ and Compensation 
- John T. Addison & Christopher J. Surfield 
 
2005-13 The Demand for Labor: An Analysis Using Matched Employer-Employee Data from the 
German LIAB. Will the High Unskilled Worker Own-Wage Elasticity Please Stand Up? 
- John T. Addison, Lutz Bellmann, Thorsten Schank & Paulino Teixeira 
 
2005-12 Works Councils in the Production Process 
- John T. Addison, Thorsten Schank, Claus Schnabel & Joachim Wagnerd 
 
2005-11 Second Order Filter Distribution Approximations for Financial Time Series with Extreme 
Outliers 
- J. Q. Smith & António A. F. Santos 
 
2005-10 Firm Growth and Persistence of Chance: Evidence from Portuguese Microdata 
- Blandina Oliveira & Adelino Fortunato 
 
2005-09 Residential water demand under block rates – a Portuguese case study 
- Rita Martins & Adelino Fortunato 
 
2005-08 Politico-Economic Causes of Labor Regulation in the United States: Alliances and Raising 
Rivals’ Costs (and Sometimes Lowering One’s Own) 
- John T. Addison 
 
2005-07 Firm Growth and Liquidity Constraints: A Dynamic Analysis 
- Blandina Oliveira & Adelino Fortunato 
 
2005-06 The Effect of Works Councils on Employment Change 
- John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira 
 
2005-05 Le Rôle de la Consommation Publique dans la Croissance: le cas de l'Union Européenne 
- João Sousa Andrade, Maria Adelaide Silva Duarte & Claude Berthomieu 
 
2005-04 The Dynamics of the Growth of Firms: Evidence from the Services Sector 
- Blandina Oliveira & Adelino Fortunato 
 
Estudos do GEMF 
 
2005-03 The Determinants of Firm Performance: Unions, Works Councils, and Employee 
Involvement/High Performance Work Practices 
- John T. Addison 
 
2005-02 Has the Stability and Growth Pact stabilised? Evidence from a panel of 12 European 
countries and some implications for the reform of the Pact 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
 
2005-01 Sustainability of Portuguese Fiscal Policy in Historical Perspective 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
 
  
2004-03 Human capital, mechanisms of technological diffusion and the role of technological shocks 
in the speed of diffusion. Evidence from a panel of Mediterranean countries 
- Maria Adelaide Duarte & Marta Simões 
 
2004-02 What Have We Learned About The Employment Effects of Severance Pay? Further 
Iterations of Lazear et al. 
- John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira 
 
2004-01 How the Gold Standard Functioned in Portugal: an analysis of some macroeconomic aspects 
- António Portugal Duarte & João Sousa Andrade 
 
  
2003-07 Testing Gibrat’s Law: Empirical Evidence from a Panel of Portuguese Manufacturing Firms 
- Blandina Oliveira & Adelino Fortunato 
 
2003-06 Régimes Monétaires et Théorie Quantitative du Produit Nominal au Portugal (1854-1998) 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
2003-05 Causas do Atraso na Estabilização da Inflação: Abordagem Teórica e Empírica 
- Vítor Castro 
  
2003-04 The Effects of Households’ and Firms’ Borrowing Constraints on Economic Growth 
- Maria da Conceição Costa Pereira 
 
2003-03 Second Order Filter Distribution Approximations for Financial Time Series with Extreme 
Outliers 
- J. Q. Smith & António A. F. Santos 
 
2003-02 Output Smoothing in EMU and OECD: Can We Forego Government Contribution? A risk 
sharing approach 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
 
2003-01 Um modelo VAR para uma Avaliação Macroeconómica de Efeitos da Integração Europeia 
da Economia Portuguesa  
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
  
2002-08 Discrimination des facteurs potentiels de croissance et type de convergence de l’économie 
portugaise dans l’UE à travers la  spécification de la fonction de production macro-
économique. Une étude appliquée de données de panel et de séries temporelles 
- Marta Simões & Maria Adelaide Duarte 
 
2002-07 Privatisation in Portugal: employee owners or just happy employees? 
-Luís Moura Ramos & Rita Martins 
 
2002-06 The Portuguese Money Market: An analysis of the daily session 
- Fátima Teresa Sol Murta 
 
2002-05 As teorias de ciclo políticos e o caso português 
- Rodrigo Martins 
 
Estudos do GEMF 
 
2002-04 Fundos de acções internacionais: uma avaliação de desempenho 
- Nuno M. Silva 
 
2002-03 The consistency of optimal policy rules in stochastic rational expectations models 
- David Backus & John Driffill 
 
2002-02 The term structure of the spreads between Portuguese and German interest rates during 
stage II of EMU 
- José Soares da Fonseca 
 
2002-01 O processo desinflacionista português: análise de alguns custos e benefícios 
- António Portugal Duarte 
 
  
2001-14 Equity prices and monetary policy: an overview with an exploratory model 
- Fernando Alexandre & Pedro Bação 
 
2001-13 A convergência das taxas de juro portuguesas para os níveis europeus durante a segunda 
metade da década de noventa 
- José Soares da Fonseca 
 
2001-12 Le rôle de l’investissement dans l’éducation sur la croissance selon différentes spécifications 
du capital humain.  
- Adelaide Duarte & Marta Simões 
 
2001-11 Ricardian Equivalence: An Empirical Application to the Portuguese Economy 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
 
2001-10 A Especificação da Função de Produção Macro-Económica em Estudos de Crescimento 
Económico. 
- Maria Adelaide Duarte e Marta Simões 
 
2001-09 Eficácia da Análise Técnica no Mercado Accionista Português 
- Nuno Silva 
 
2001-08 The Risk Premiums in the Portuguese Treasury Bills Interest Rates: Estimation by a 
cointegration method 
- José Soares da Fonseca 
 
2001-07 Principais factores de crescimento da economia portuguesa no espaço europeu 
- Maria Adelaide Duarte e Marta Simões 
 
2001-06 Inflation Targeting and Exchange Rate Co-ordination 
- Fernando Alexandre, John Driffill e Fabio Spagnolo 
 
2001-05 Labour Market Transition in Portugal, Spain, and Poland: A Comparative Perspective 
- Paulino Teixeira 
 
2001-04 Paridade do Poder de Compra e das Taxas de Juro: Um estudo aplicado a três países da 
UEM 
- António Portugal Duarte 
 
2001-03 Technology, Employment and Wages 
- John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira 
 
2001-02 Human capital investment through education and economic growth. A panel data analysis 
based on a group of Latin American countries 
- Maria Adelaide Duarte & Marta Simões 
 
2001-01 Risk Premiums in the Porutguese Treasury Bills Interest Rates from 1990 to 1998. An 
ARCH-M Approach 
- José Soares da Fonseca 
 
  
Estudos do GEMF 
 
2000-08 Identificação de Vectores de Cointegração: Análise de Alguns Exemplos  
- Pedro Miguel Avelino Bação 
 
2000-07 Imunização e M-quadrado: Que relação? 
- Jorge Cunha 
 
2000-06 Eficiência Informacional nos Futuros Lisbor 3M 
- Nuno M. Silva 
 
2000-05 Estimation of Default Probabilities Using Incomplete Contracts Data 
- J. Santos Silva & J. Murteira 
 
2000-04 Un Essaie d'Application de la Théorie Quantitative de la Monnaie à l’économie portugaise, 
1854-1998 
-  João Sousa Andrade 
2000-03 Le Taux de Chômage Naturel comme un Indicateur de Politique Economique? Une 
application à l’économie portugaise 
- Adelaide Duarte & João Sousa Andrade 
 
2000-02 La Convergence Réelle Selon la Théorie de la Croissance: Quelles Explications pour l'Union 
Européenne? 
- Marta Cristina Nunes Simões 
 
2000-01 Política de Estabilização e Independência dos Bancos Centrais 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
  
1999-09 Nota sobre a Estimação de Vectores de Cointegração com os Programas CATS in RATS, 
PCFIML e EVIEWS 
- Pedro Miguel Avelino Bação 
 
1999-08 A Abertura do Mercado de Telecomunicações Celulares ao Terceiro Operador: Uma 
Decisão Racional? 
- Carlos Carreira 
 
1999-07 Is Portugal Really so Arteriosclerotic? Results from a Cross-Country Analysis of Labour 
Adjustment 
- John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira 
 
1999-06 The Effect of Dismissals Protection on Employment: More on a Vexed Theme 
- John T. Addison, Paulino Teixeira e Jean-Luc Grosso 
 
1999-05 A Cobertura Estática e Dinâmica através do Contrato de Futuros PSI-20. Estimação das 
Rácios e Eficácia Ex Post e Ex Ante 
- Helder Miguel C. V. Sebastião 
 
1999-04 Mobilização de Poupança, Financiamento e Internacionalização de Carteiras 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
1999-03 Natural Resources and Environment 
- Adelaide Duarte 
 
1999-02 L'Analyse Positive de la Politique Monétaire 
- Chistian Aubin 
 
1999-01 Economias de Escala e de Gama nos Hospitais Públicos Portugueses: Uma Aplicação da 
Função de Custo Variável Translog 
- Carlos Carreira 
 
  
1998-11 Equilíbrio Monetário no Longo e Curto Prazos - Uma Aplicação à Economia Portuguesa 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
Estudos do GEMF 
 
1998-10 Algumas Observações Sobre o Método da Economia 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
1998-09 Mudança Tecnológica na Indústria Transformadora: Que Tipo de Viés Afinal? 
- Paulino Teixeira 
 
1998-08 Portfolio Insurance and Bond Management in a Vasicek's Term Structure of Interest Rates 
- José Alberto Soares da Fonseca 
 
1998-07 Financial Innovation and Money Demand in Portugal: A Preliminary Study 
- Pedro Miguel Avelino Bação 
 
1998-06 The Stability Pact and Portuguese Fiscal Policy: the Application of a VAR Model 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
 
1998-05 A Moeda Única e o Processo de Difusão da Base Monetária 
- José Alberto Soares da Fonseca 
 
1998-04 La Structure par Termes et la Volatilité des Taux d'intérêt LISBOR 
- José Alberto Soares da Fonseca 
 
1998-03 Regras de Comportamento e Reformas Monetárias no Novo SMI 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
1998-02 Um Estudo da Flexibilidade dos Salários: o Caso Espanhol e Português 
- Adelaide Duarte e João Sousa Andrade 
 
1998-01 Moeda Única e Internacionalização: Apresentação do Tema 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
  
1997-09 Inovação e Aplicações Financeiras em Portugal 
- Pedro Miguel Avelino Bação 
 
1997-08 Estudo do Efeito Liquidez Aplicado à Economia Portuguesa 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
1997-07 An Introduction to Conditional Expectations and Stationarity 
- Rui Manuel de Almeida 
 
1997-06 Definição de Moeda e Efeito Berlusconi 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
1997-05 A Estimação do Risco na Escolha dos Portafólios: Uma Visão Selectiva 
- António Alberto Ferreira dos Santos 
 
1997-04 A Previsão Não Paramétrica de Taxas de Rentabilidade 
- Pedro Manuel Cortesão Godinho 
 
1997-03 Propriedades Assimptóticas de Densidades 
- Rui Manuel de Almeida 
 
1997-02 Co-Integration and VAR Analysis of the Term Structure of Interest Rates: an empirical study 
of the Portuguese money and bond markets 
-João Sousa Andrade & José Soares da Fonseca 
 
1997-01 Repartição e Capitalização. Duas Modalidades Complementares de Financiamento das 
Reformas 
- Maria Clara Murteira 
 
  
1996-08 A Crise e o Ressurgimento do Sistema Monetário Europeu 
- Luis Manuel de Aguiar Dias 
 
1996-07 Housing Shortage and Housing Investment in Portugal a Preliminary View 
- Vítor Neves 
 
Estudos do GEMF 
 
1996-06 Housing, Mortgage Finance and the British Economy 
- Kenneth Gibb & Nile Istephan 
 
1996-05 The Social Policy of The European Community, Reporting Information to Employees, a U.K. 
perspective: Historical Analysis and Prognosis 
- Ken Shackleton 
 
1996-04 O Teorema da Equivalência Ricardiana: aplicação à economia portuguesa 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
 
1996-03 O Teorema da Equivalência Ricardiana: discussão teórica 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
1996-02 As taxas de juro no MMI e a Restrição das Reservas Obrigatórias dos Bancos 
- Fátima Assunção Sol e José Alberto Soares da Fonseca 
 
1996-01 Uma Análise de Curto Prazo do Consumo, do Produto e dos Salários 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
